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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT  
With respect to this cross-appeal, the government does not contest that the 
Affordable Care Act threatens the States with the non plus ultra of coercion — the 
loss of the entirety of their Medicaid funding, more than 40% of all federal 
funding — if they do not capitulate to Congress‘s latest demands to radically 
expand Medicaid coverage.  Rather than deny this basic fact or its clear coercive 
effect, the government invites this Court to ignore the coercion doctrine altogether.  
That is not an invitation that a court of appeals may accept.  The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly assured States and federal courts that there are outer limits on the 
federal spending power and that there is a point where federal spending programs 
become ―so coercive as to pass the point at which ‗pressure turns into 
compulsion.‘‖  South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward 
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).  Without such a limit, the federal 
spending power threatens the entire constitutional structure — Congress can 
commandeer the States to any degree or impose any command that does not violate 
an affirmative constitutional prohibition by the simple expedient of attaching it to a 
pre-existing pool of federal money too large to decline.   
As the government implicitly recognizes in failing to defend Congress‘s 
methods on the merits, the ACA is coercive by any imaginable measure.  If the 
ACA does not pass the point of undue coercion, no act of Congress ever will.  
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Medicaid is the largest federal grant-in-aid program to States, accounting for 
hundreds of billions of federal tax dollars collected from States‘ citizens.  
Congress‘s threat to withhold all Medicaid funding from any State that does not 
comply with the new conditions imposed by the ACA plainly leaves States no 
choice but to capitulate to Congress‘s demands.  States are effectively coerced by 
their past decisions to accept federal funds.  By tying new impositions to a pre-
existing pool of funds that induced compliance with earlier impositions, the federal 
government makes it effectively impossible for the States to exercise any 
meaningful choice or escape the vortex of ever-increasing conditions.  Indeed, the 
ACA is largely premised on Congress‘s certainty that no State could reject its 
demand to adopt and fund the Act‘s substantial expansions to Medicaid.  There is 
no back-up plan in the event a State says no. 
Because the coercive Medicaid expansions cannot be severed from the rest 
of the Act, their unconstitutionality renders the entire ACA invalid.  The Medicaid 
expansions are a central component of Congress‘s comprehensive scheme to 
achieve near-universal health insurance coverage.  Without that means of forcing 
States to provide free insurance to millions more low-income individuals, the ACA 
cannot ―function in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress,‖ Alaska 
Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987), and thus cannot withstand the 
severance analysis. 




I. The Coercion Doctrine Is A Critical Limitation On Congress’s Power 
To Place Conditions Upon States’ Acceptance Of Federal Funds. 
A. The Supreme Court Has Repeatedly Recognized the Continuing 
Vitality of the Coercion Doctrine. 
The government‘s principal response to the States‘ coercion claim is to deny 
the existence of the coercion doctrine.  Supreme Court precedent confirms 
otherwise.  As the Court has admonished, ―[t]he spending power is of course not 
unlimited, … but is instead subject to several general restrictions articulated in [the 
Supreme Court‘s] cases.‖  Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.  Dole makes clear that the 
coercion doctrine is one of those limitations:  ―Our decisions have recognized that 
in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so 
coercive as to pass the point at which ‗pressure turns into compulsion.‘‖  Id. at 211 
(quoting Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 590); see also Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 687 (1999) (―in cases involving 
conditions attached to federal funding, we have acknowledged that the financial 
inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which 
pressure turns into compulsion‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sabri v. 
United States, 541 U.S. 600, 608 (2004) (rejecting coercion claim on the merits).1  
                                       
1 The government wrongly asserts that the ACA does not ―contravene [the four 
other] restrictions‖ set out in South Dakota v. Dole and that the States do not 
contend otherwise.  See Govt.‘s Response/Reply Br. 48–49.  The ACA does, 
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That limitation is a necessary corollary of the Court‘s recognition that ―the 
Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority to require the States to 
regulate,‖ New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992), either directly or 
through conditions attached to coercive federal inducements. 
In arguing that the Court has somehow abandoned that critical limitation on 
Congress‘s vast spending power, the government mistakenly reads the Court‘s 
efforts to explain the limits of the coercion doctrine as abandoning it altogether.  
See Govt.‘s Response/Reply Br. 50–51.  Placed in proper context, the statements 
upon which the government relies are plainly directed at the former, not the latter.   
For example, although the Court cautioned in Steward Machine ―that motive 
or temptation is [not] equivalent to coercion,‖ 301 U.S. at 589-90, it did so in the 
context of rejecting a vastly overbroad theory of coercion, and one advanced by a 
private party, not a State.  As the Court emphasized in rejecting that claim, no State 
alleged that its decision to adopt the conditions challenged by the plaintiff ―was 
affected by duress.‖  Id.  The plaintiff therefore presented the Court with a 
coercion claim that essentially boiled down to the argument that spending 
conditions are always coercive because States must leave money on the table if 
                                                                                                                           
indeed, contravene these restrictions, as the States and amici have noted.  See, e.g., 
States‘ Opening Br. 48, 51–53 (no ―reasonable relationship‖); see also Brief Amici 
Curiae of Minnesota Legislators, et al., especially at 9-10 & n.21 (ACA is 
ambiguous and unclear). 
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they reject them.  It was in rejecting that untenable conception of coercion that the 
Court explained that every offer of federal funds ―when conditioned upon conduct 
is in some measure a temptation,‖ but that ―to hold that motive or temptation is 
equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law into endless difficulties.‖  Id. at 589–90 
(emphasis added). 
Read against the backdrop of the coercion claim pressed in Steward 
Machine, the Court‘s language was plainly intended to reject the argument that 
spending conditions are always coercive, not to embrace the argument that 
spending conditions are never coercive.  That much is clear from the Court‘s 
ultimate holding that, ―[i]n [these] circumstances, if in no others, inducement or 
persuasion does not go beyond the bounds of power.‖  Id. at 591 (emphasis added).  
The Court went on to explain:  ―We do not fix the outermost line.  Enough for 
present purposes that wherever the line may be, this statute is within it.‖  Id.   
The government‘s suggestion that Dole cast doubt on the coercion doctrine 
is even less plausible.  First and foremost, Dole rejected a coercion claim on the 
merits, a wholly incoherent step if the Court had at the same time meant to declare 
all coercion claims nonjusticiable.  The Court began by explicitly and approvingly 
acknowledging that its past ―decisions have recognized that in some circumstances 
the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the 
point at which ‗pressure turns into compulsion.‘‖  Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting 
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Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 590)).2  The Court then held that the facts at hand did 
not constitute forbidden coercion, primarily because only ―a relatively small 
percentage of certain highway funds‖ (about $4 million) was at stake.  Id.  Only 
after concluding that the State‘s coercion claim was ―more rhetoric than fact‖ did 
the Court repeat Steward Machine‘s admonishment that ―to hold that motive or 
temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law into endless difficulties.‖  
Id. (quoting Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 589-90).   
Once again, context makes clear that the Court was cautioning against 
overreading the coercion doctrine, not encouraging courts to ignore it.  Notably, 
the court that has made the most serious effort to apply Dole and Steward Machine 
has correctly understood the Court‘s cautionary language as just that.  See Madison 
v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 128 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Dole and Steward Machine 
for the proposition that ―every financial incentive is in some measure a temptation 
…. [b]ut hard choices do not alone amount to coercion‖ (emphasis added)). 
                                       
2 Notably, the two dissenters in Dole did not disagree with the Court‘s 
characterization (or application) of the Court‘s coercion doctrine.  Indeed, they 
would have embraced an even more restrictive view of the spending power, under 
which Congress would have ―no power … to impose requirements on a grant that 
go beyond specifying how the money should be spent.‖  Dole, 483 U.S. at 216 
(O‘Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (―Congress 
cannot condition a federal grant in a manner that abridges‖ a right reserved to the 
States.).  
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As the foregoing illustrates, the government‘s attempts to reduce the 
coercion doctrine to ―a single sentence from Dole,‖ Govt.‘s Response/Reply Br. 
50, substantially misread the Court‘s discussions of the doctrine.  Moreover, the 
government wholly ignores the fact that the Court has continued to recognize the 
coercion doctrine years after Dole was decided.  See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 687 
(―in cases involving conditions attached to federal funding, we have acknowledged 
that the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass 
the point at which pressure turns into compulsion‖ (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also Sabri, 541 U.S. at 608 (rejecting coercion claim on merits).  As 
these cases confirm, notwithstanding the difficulty of ascertaining ―the point at 
which pressure turns into compulsion,‖ Steward Machine, 309 U.S. at 590, the 
Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to abandon that analysis.  It could hardly be 
otherwise.  Acknowledging no limits on concededly coercive uses of the federal 
spending power would require admitting that, rather than ―split[ing] the atom of 
sovereignty,‖ U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring), the Framers empowered the federal government to force 
the States to yield their reserved powers. 
B. This Court Should Reject the Approach of Courts that Have 
Refused to Adjudicate Coercion Claims.   
As the district court acknowledged, R.E. 2011, this Court has not yet had 
occasion to address the contours of the coercion doctrine.  To the extent the 
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government suggests it did so in Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 
2004), see Govt.‘s Response/Reply Br. 51, the government is plainly mistaken.  
Benning — a case recently overruled by the Supreme Court, see Sossamon v. 
Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011) — did not involve a coercion claim.  Quite the 
contrary, instead of arguing that the federal inducement at stake was so large as to 
leave it with no choice but to accept it, Georgia argued that the inducement was so 
small that States should not have to abide by the onerous condition Congress 
attached to it (a waiver of sovereign immunity).  See Benning, 391 F.3d at 1308 
(―Georgia also wrongly argues that the extensive conditions imposed … are not in 
proportion to the small amount of federal funds‖).  Accordingly, when the Court 
concluded that a State ―cannot accept federal funds and then attempt to avoid their 
accompanying conditions by arguing that the conditions are disproportionate in 
scope,‖ id., it was plainly speaking of the circumstances under which a State might 
avoid noncoercive spending conditions, not the circumstances under which the 
Court might consider a spending condition coercive. 
In urging this Court to reject the States‘ coercion claim out of hand, the 
government is thus forced to rely heavily on a line of cases that cannot be 
reconciled with (and in some cases even predate) the Supreme Court‘s most recent 
pronouncements on the coercion doctrine and the justiciability of Tenth 
Amendment claims.   
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For example, the government emphasizes (at 51–52) the D.C. Circuit‘s 
opinion in Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401 (1981), one of the first cases to 
posit that coercion claims are nonjusticiable.  But the government ignores the fact 
that Schweiker was decided six years before Dole.  That is not a mere technicality.  
Schweiker‘s justiciability analysis is largely premised on its misreading of Steward 
Machine as ―admonish[ing] … that courts should attempt to avoid becoming 
entangled‖ in adjudicating coercion claims.  Id. at 413.  That reading is difficult 
enough to square with Steward Machine, which expressly declined to ―fix the 
outermost line‖ at which the Court will consider spending legislation persuasive 
rather than coercive.  Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 591.  It is all but impossible to 
reconcile with Dole, which made clear that Steward Machine did ―recognize[] that 
in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so 
coercive as to pass the point at which ‗pressure turns into compulsion.‘‖  Dole, 483 
U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 590).  It is thus far from clear 
(and the D.C. Circuit has not decided) whether Schweiker‘s coercion analysis is 
even good law after Dole, which is reason enough for this Court to reject it.     
The government also relies (at 52–53) on the Ninth Circuit‘s obiter dictum 
in Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448–49 (9th Cir. 1989), one of the most oft-
cited cases for the proposition that coercion claims are nonjusticiable.  But Judge 
Reinhardt‘s opinion in Skinner is, if possible, even less reconcilable with Supreme 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/24/2011     Page: 19 of 41
10 
 
Court precedent than Schweiker.  First, Skinner implausibly posited, despite the 
Court‘s recent reaffirmation of the coercion doctrine in Dole, that the Court had in 
fact implicitly rejected the doctrine in a case decided two years before Dole.  See 
id. at 448 (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), 
for the proposition that courts can never hold that federal laws intrude on state 
sovereignty because ―this sovereignty is adequately protected by the national 
political process‖).  If that time-bending effort to view Garcia, not Dole, as the 
Supreme Court‘s last word on coercion were not enough to discredit Skinner‘s 
analysis, the Supreme Court has since conclusively rejected the very 
nonjusticiability reasoning of Garcia upon which Skinner so heavily relied.  See 
New York, 505 U.S. at 177 (striking down federal law as unconstitutionally 
infringing upon state sovereignty); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 
(1997) (same). 
Beyond that, the government cites a string of cases from a small number of 
circuits that have summarily rejected coercion claims after adopting the same 
faulty nonjusticiability analysis as Schweiker and Skinner.  See California v. 
United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997) (reading Skinner as finding no 
―viability left in the coercion theory‖); Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 
1082 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (declaring, over objection of four dissenters, 
threatened loss of $250 million funds nothing more than ―politically painful‖); 
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Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000) (relying on 
Schweiker and Skinner to reject a coercion clam); Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 
639, 652 (8th Cir. 2009) (rejecting coercion claim as foreclosed by Eighth Circuit 
precedent).3   
These opinions make no attempt to reconcile their hostility to the coercion 
doctrine with the fact that the Court has repeatedly affirmed its continuing vitality 
notwithstanding the potentially difficult applications that Schweiker and Skinner 
highlighted.  See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (reaffirming doctrine‘s existence five years 
after Schweiker); Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 687 (reaffirming doctrine‘s existence 
ten years after Skinner); see also Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 570 
(4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (concluding, nearly ten years after 
Skinner, that ―if the Court meant what it said in Dole, then … a Tenth Amendment 
                                       
3 The government‘s characterization of Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 29 
(2d Cir. 1996), as rejecting a coercion claim is mistaken.  There, New York 
claimed the federal government had subjected it to impermissible commandeering 
by requiring the State to provide emergency medical services to illegal 
immigrants.  See id.  The Second Circuit rejected that claim on the ground that 
States are not legally required to provide such services, but instead provide them as 
a condition of voluntary participation in Medicaid.  See id.  In reaching that 
conclusion, the court gave no indication that it considered whether a State might be 
able to allege that participation in Medicaid is voluntary in theory but not in fact.  
The court did not even mention Congress‘s spending power, let alone Dole, 
Steward Machine, or the coercion doctrine.  See id. 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/24/2011     Page: 21 of 41
12 
 
claim of the highest order lies‖ when a State is subjected to coercion).4  This Court 
should decline the government‘s invitation to simply ignore the Supreme Court‘s 
affirmation that there are limits on the federal government‘s ability to coerce the 
States. 
C. The Government’s Policy Arguments Against the Coercion 
Doctrine Are Fundamentally Misguided. 
In a last-ditch effort to persuade this Court to reject a doctrine that the 
Supreme Court has explicitly endorsed, the government falls back on a variety of 
inapposite policy arguments.  Far from undermining the utility of the coercion 
doctrine, the government‘s arguments underscore its necessity as a means of 
keeping Congress‘s vast spending power in check.   
First, pointing to disagreement among States as to whether the ACA‘s 
expansions to Medicaid will cost or save States money in the long run, the 
government asserts that courts are ill-equipped to ―resolve th[e] state policy 
disagreements‖ that often underlie coercion claims.  Govt.‘s Response/Reply Br. 
                                       
4 To the extent that the government implies that the Fourth Circuit has abandoned 
the coercion doctrine, see Govt.‘s Response/Reply Br. 53–54, it is mistaken.  
Notwithstanding the fact that ―the holding of Riley was superseded by legislation,‖ 
or the Fourth Circuit‘s ―acknowledge[ment]‖ that sister circuits have refused to 
take Dole at face value, Govt.‘s Response/Reply Br. 53–54, the court has reiterated 
and adopted the Riley plurality‘s coercion analysis.  See, e.g., West Virginia v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 290 (4th Cir. 2002) (―In this 
circuit, … the coercion theory is not viewed with such suspicion, but instead has 
been endorsed by a substantial number of judges on this court.‖); Madison, 474 
F.3d at 128 (―Dole[] … bars coercive financial inducements.‖). 
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55.  That argument largely misses the point of the coercion doctrine.  The doctrine 
exists to protect a State‘s prerogative to determine whether Congress is offering a 
good deal or a bad deal.  See New York, 505 U.S. at 168 (―by any … permissible 
method of encouraging a State to conform to federal policy choices, the residents 
of the State retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not the State will 
comply‖).  The argument that the ACA is so complex and has so many moving 
pieces that neither the States nor this Court can clearly perceive whether it is a 
good or bad deal is a justification for applying the coercion doctrine, not for 
obliterating it.  See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (requiring that terms attached to federal 
funds be unambiguous so that States may ―exercise their choice knowingly, 
cognizant of the consequences of‖ accepting funds (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
For the same reason, it is irrelevant that Congress thinks it has offered the 
States a good deal.  See Govt.‘s Response/Reply Br. 55.  As an initial matter, were 
the terms anywhere near as a good a bargain as the government claims (a point the 
States vigorously contest), then Congress would stand nothing to lose by giving 
States a real choice to accept or reject them.  But more to the point, as the 
government itself argues, whether a State is willing and able to accept the terms 
attached to a federal inducement is a matter that differs from one State to the next.  
Congress is in no better position than the courts to usurp each State‘s ability to 
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make that assessment for itself, no matter how good a deal Congress may 
(erroneously) consider its offer.5 
Finally, there is no merit to the government‘s argument that the States‘ 
coercion challenge ―seek[s] to block the expansion of Medicaid coverage … at the 
expense of the states that want Medicaid expanded.‖  Govt.‘s Response/Reply Br. 
56 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Plaintiff States are not arguing that the 
coercion doctrine precludes Congress from encouraging States to adopt expansions 
to Medicaid, or from offering additional funding to States that wish to do so.  They 
are simply arguing that Congress may not force States to adopt those expansions, 
but must instead employ means that leave States with a meaningful choice — 
means that induce rather than coerce.  See New York, 505 U.S. at 166 (recognizing 
―a variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress may urge a 
State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests‖ (emphasis 
added)).6  If some States are willing to strike whatever bargain Congress might 
                                       
5 Moreover, as the States pointed out in their opening brief (at 59), that Congress 
has tied another $434 billion in addition to the entirety of the vast pool of pre-
existing Medicaid funds to States‘ acceptance of the ACA‘s Medicaid expansions 
renders the Act more coercive, not less, as it dramatically increases the amount of 
federal funding States will lose if they do not capitulate to Congress‘s demands. 
6 The government‘s (and the district court‘s) reliance on 42 U.S.C. § 1304 is 
misplaced for the same reason.  See Govt.‘s Response/Reply Br. 46; R.E. 2010.  
That Congress reserved ―[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision of‖ 
Medicaid does not mean that Congress may employ coercion when doing so. Id.  
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propose, they are free to do so at their own peril.  But their preferences, like 
Congress‘s, cannot override the desire of other States to decline.  
II. The ACA’s Medicaid Expansions Exceed Congress’s Spending Power.  
Notwithstanding its insistence that coercion claims are nonjusticiable, the 
government makes no effort to demonstrate that the coercion analysis set forth in 
the States‘ opening brief is incapable of meaningful judicial application.  Nor does 
it argue that the means Congress employed in the ACA could survive that analysis.  
The government thus implicitly concedes that, so long as there is such a thing as an 
unconstitutionally coercive exercise of Congress‘s spending power, this is it.  That 
concession is hardly surprising given that Congress itself recognized that the Act is 
coercive.  This Court should do the same.   
A. Congress May Not Place Wholly Disproportionate Conditions on 
Massive Federal Inducements to States.   
Federal spending programs do not spring forth as a spontaneous outflowing 
of federal largesse; they reflect the spending of tax dollars the federal government 
collects from States‘ citizens.  The coercion doctrine therefore limits ―the extent to 
which the Federal Government may … impose its policy preferences upon the 
States by placing conditions upon the return of revenues that were collected from 
the States‘ citizenry in the first place.‖  Riley, 106 F.3d at 570.  It could not be 
otherwise.  Without some limit on coercion, the federal power to tax, then spend, 
could eliminate our system of dual sovereignty. 
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―At its most basic, … the coercion inquiry focuses on the financial 
inducement offered by Congress,‖ Madison, 474 F.3d at 128 (internal quotation 
marks omitted), both in actual size and in proportion to other federal and state 
funding.  Compare Riley, 106 F.3d at 569-70 (finding threatened loss of $60 
million coercive), and Jim C., 235 F.3d at 1083 (Bowman, J., dissenting) (finding 
threatened loss of $250 million coercive), with Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (finding 
threatened loss of 5% of federal highway funding (about $4 million) only 
―relatively mild encouragement‖), and Madison, 474 F.3d at 128 (finding it 
―difficult to see how‖ loss of federal funds accounting for only 1.3% of State‘s 
prison funding ―could leave the State without a real choice‖).  As these cases 
reflect, while it may be difficult to draw the precise line at which ―pressure turns 
into compulsion,‖ Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590, in most instances (as here), it 
is not at all difficult to determine on which side of that line an inducement falls.  
See Riley, 106 F.3d at 570 (―The difference between a $1000 grant and … a $60 
million grant, insofar as their coercive potential is concerned, is self-evident.‖). 
―[A] Spending Clause statute that conditions an entire block of federal funds 
on a State‘s compliance with a federal directive raises coercion concerns.‖  
Madison, 474 F.3d at 128; see also Jim C., 235 F.3d at 1083 (Bowman, J., 
dissenting).  That is particularly true when the conditions Congress seeks to impose 
are attached not just to newly provided funds but to pre-existing pools already 
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encumbered with pre-existing conditions, and thus where the new conditions bear 
little or no relationship to most of the funds at stake.  See Riley, 106 F.3d at 570 (―a 
Tenth Amendment claim of the highest order lies where … the Federal 
Government … withholds the entirety of a substantial federal grant on the ground 
that the States refuse to fulfill their obligations in some insubstantial respect‖); 
West Virginia, 289 F.3d at 291 (―[F]ederal statutes that threaten the loss of an 
entire block of federal funds upon a relatively minor failing by a state are 
constitutionally suspect.‖).  When that kind of disproportionality is coupled with 
the threatened loss of a massive amount of federal funding, Congress has plainly 
engaged in impermissible coercion. 
The government mistakes this proportionality inquiry for a rule that a 
spending condition can only be coercive if it is ―insubstantial‖ in relation to the 
broader federal program at issue.  See Govt.‘s Response/Reply Br. 54.  
Substantiality is not the concern at which the inquiry is aimed.  It is instead a 
limitation derived from a principle the Supreme Court has long recognized — that 
―[t]here is an obvious difference between a statute stating the conditions upon 
which moneys shall be expended and one effective only upon an assumption of a 
contractual obligation to submit to a regulation which otherwise could not be 
enforced.‖  United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 73 (1936).  When the condition 
Congress seeks to impose bears no relationship to the bulk of the federal funding it 
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threatens to withhold, and indeed targets pre-existing streams of funding, Congress 
is no longer ―stating the conditions upon which moneys shall be expended,‖ but is 
instead forcing States ―to submit to a regulation which otherwise could not be 
enforced.‖  Id.   
Congress may have some capacity to achieve the latter when the amount of 
money at stake is sufficiently minimal to leave States with a real choice as to 
whether to accept the terms it proposes.  See Dole, 483 U.S. at 206–07.  But when 
Congress eliminates the element of choice from the equation by threatening to 
withhold federal funding that States literally cannot afford to forfeit, ―the Federal 
Government has, in an act more akin to forbidden regulation than to permissible 
condition, supplanted with its own policy preferences the considered judgments of 
the States.‖  Riley, 106 F.3d at 570.  As Justice O‘Connor has cautioned, ―given the 
vast financial resources of the Federal Government,‖ such an overly broad 
conception of the spending power would ―give[] ‗power to the Congress to tear 
down the barriers [and] to invade the states‘ jurisdiction, … subject to no 
restrictions save such as are self-imposed.‘‖  Dole, 483 U.S. at 217 (O‘Connor, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at 78).  That ―was not the Framers‘ plan and 
it is not the meaning of the Spending Clause.‖  Id.   
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B. The Size of the Inducement and the Nature of the Conditions 
Attached to it Render the ACA’s Medicaid Expansions Coercive. 
By any measure, the size of the federal inducement at stake here is coercive.  
Medicaid is the largest federal grant-in-aid program, accounting for more than 40% 
of all federal grants to States and 7% of all federal spending.  States‘ Opening Br. 
6.  The average State receives well over $1 billion a year in federal Medicaid 
funding, R.E.1551–55, which is 250 times as much money as the Court deemed 
―relatively mild encouragement‖ in Dole.  483 U.S. at 211.  Federal funding covers 
at least half and as much as 83 percent of each State‘s Medicaid costs, Govt.‘s 
Response/Reply Br. 45, which dwarfs the ―mere 1.3% of prison funding‖ that the 
Fourth Circuit deemed too insignificant to amount to coercion in Madison.  
Madison, 474 F.3d at 128.  Indeed, federal Medicaid funds account, on average, for 
at least 10% of a State‘s entire annual budget, R.E. 1555, leaving no question that 
States lack any feasible means ―of making up those lost funds if the State elects not 
to‖ accept federal funding.  Jim C., 235 F.3d at 1083 (Bowman, J., dissenting).   
The government does not deny that States stand to lose all of their billions of 
dollars of Medicaid funding, including pre-existing funds, if they do not accept the 
expanded coverage provisions mandated by the ACA.  See Govt.‘s 
Response/Reply Br. 45–47; compare West Virginia, 289 F.3d at 292 (rejecting 
coercion claim where State failed to substantiate its claim that government 
―with[e]ld (or threatened to withhold) the entirety of a substantial federal grant‖).  
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Nor does the government try to deny that the sheer amount of money at stake and 
its source — it is money largely collected from the States‘ citizenry in the first 
place — eliminates States‘ ability to reject it.7  Quite the contrary, the government 
openly argues that even those States that support the ACA‘s expansions to 
Medicaid do so because they cannot afford to lose the enormous inducement at 
stake.  See Govt.‘s Response/Reply Br. 54–55.  
The government also offers no response to the States‘ argument that the 
ACA is rendered even more coercive by the nature of the conditions it attaches to 
States‘ continued receipt of Medicaid funding.  As the States explained in their 
opening brief, ―the ACA does not simply (or even primarily) impose conditions on 
how States spend federal funds,‖ but instead conditions receipt of any Medicaid 
funds on States‘ agreement ―to adopt, enforce, and even help fund‖ the ACA‘s 
substantial expansions to Medicaid.  States‘ Opening Br. 54; see also Butler, 297 
U.S. at 73 (―There is an obvious difference between a statute stating the conditions 
                                       
7 To the extent that the government suggests (at 49) that the States have conceded, 
or this Court has decided, that participation in Medicaid remains voluntary, that 
suggestion is meritless.  Participation in Medicaid is of course voluntary in theory; 
the program would otherwise be facially unconstitutional.  See New York, 505 U.S. 
at 178 (―the Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority to require the 
States to regulate‖).  The crux of the States‘ claim is that participation is not 
voluntary ―in fact,‖ Dole, 483 U.S. at 212, which is an issue addressed by neither 
of the cases that the government and the district court invoke.  See Govt.‘s 
Response/Reply Br. 49; R.E. 2010 (citing Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities v. Fla. 
Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2000), and 
Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 722 (11th Cir. 1998)). 
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upon which moneys shall be expended and one effective only upon an assumption 
of a contractual obligation to submit to a regulation which otherwise could not be 
enforced.‖).  That is clear from the fact that the ACA distinguishes between new 
federal funding provided to help finance the expansions it mandates, and federal 
funds States are already receiving to finance the Medicaid coverage they are 
already providing.  See ACA § 2001(a)(3) (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1)) 
(providing additional federal funding at an initially increased rate ―with respect to 
amounts expended‖ for coverage of individuals ―newly eligible‖ under the ACA).  
Although the conditions are only arguably relevant to the former, they are also 
attached to the latter.   
For that reason, the government‘s invocation of Congress‘s ability ―to 
control the uses to which federal expenditures are put,‖ Govt.‘s Response/Reply 
Br. 54, is entirely beside the point.  Congress‘s conditioning of all Medicaid 
funding, including pre-existing funding, upon adoption of the ACA‘s new terms 
was plainly not an attempt to control the uses to which the new funds would be put.  
Nor was it an attempt merely to induce or persuade States to accept the new terms.  
Instead, rather than risk the possibility that some States might choose to reject its 
new policy preferences, notwithstanding the availability of substantial new funds, 
Congress bypassed persuasion in favor of the much more expedient means of 
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coercion:  it threatened to withhold massive amounts of unrelated Medicaid 
funding from States that would not capitulate to its new demands.   
That Congress is capable of achieving its policy preferences through 
persuasion rather than coercion is readily evident from its past practices.  Indeed, 
Congress quite recently demonstrated its ability to influence (but not dictate) 
States‘ Medicaid choices when, in an effort to prevent States from responding to 
the current fiscal crisis by eliminating expanded Medicaid eligibility terms that 
they had voluntarily adopted, Congress offered additional federal funding to States 
that agreed to maintain such expansions.  See American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 5001(f).  By holding out the 
promise of additional Medicaid funding rather than threatening the elimination of 
all Medicaid funding, Congress properly (and successfully) sought to entice States 
rather than coerce them.   
By contrast, there is simply no question that the ACA was intentionally 
designed to ―impose [Congress‘s] policy preferences upon the States.‖  Riley, 106 
F.3d at 570.  As the States explained in their opening brief, Congress knew States 
would have no choice but to accept the ACA‘s substantial expansions to Medicaid, 
which is clear from the fact that the Act‘s comprehensive scheme for ―near-
universal‖ health insurance coverage, ACA § 1501(a)(2)(D), is premised upon 
States‘ continued participation in Medicaid.  See States‘ Opening Br. 54; see also 
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R.E. 434 (coercion ―can perhaps be inferred from the fact that Congress does not 
really anticipate that states will (or could) drop out of the Medicaid program‖).  
There is no back-up plan.  Far from disputing that fact, the government embraces 
it, arguing that Congress expected the ACA‘s Medicaid expansions to operate as a 
central ―part of its comprehensive regulation‖ of the health care industry, by 
―address[ing]‖ the ―problem‖ of ―low-income individuals consum[ing] 
uncompensated care.‖  Govt.‘s Response/Reply Br. 5, 9.  If the coercion doctrine 
bars anything, it plainly bars spending legislation that even Congress knows is 
coercive. 
III. Congress’s Coercive Medicaid Expansions Are A Central Part Of The 
ACA And Cannot Be Severed From The Rest Of The Act.   
The government‘s response/reply brief confirms that the Medicaid 
expansions are not severable from the balance of the ACA.  The government‘s 
only attempt to demonstrate to the contrary is its argument that ―the Medicaid 
amendments are operative on their own and therefore severable.‖  Govt.‘s 
Response/Reply Br. 59 (internal quotation marks omitted).  But whether an invalid 
provision is independently operative is beside the point.  The question is whether 
the remaining provisions of the statute are independently operative, and even that 
question is the beginning of the severance analysis, not the end.  ―The more 
relevant inquiry in evaluating severability is whether the statute will function in a 
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manner consistent with the intent of Congress.‖  Brock, 480 U.S. at 685.  The 
government implicitly concedes that the remainder of the ACA will not.  
By the government‘s own measure, the ACA‘s expansions to Medicaid are a 
central ―part of [Congress‘s] comprehensive regulation‖ of the health care industry.  
Govt.‘s Response/Reply Br. 5; see also R.E. 993-94 (describing Medicaid 
expansions as one of Act‘s ―five main components‖).  As the government 
acknowledges, ―[t]here is no doubt that low-income individuals consume 
uncompensated care‖ and are therefore within the intended reach of the individual 
mandate.  Govt.‘s Response/Reply Br. 9.  Recognizing that many of those 
individuals would find it all but impossible to purchase private health care 
insurance, Congress addressed the problem created by the mandate ―by expanding 
eligibility for Medicaid.‖  Id.; see also R.E. 984–85 (arguing that many individuals 
―are unable to obtain [insurance] without the … Medicaid eligibility expansion that 
the Act will provide‖).  Without the Medicaid expansions through which Congress 
intended to force States to provide free insurance to millions more individuals, 
there would be a gaping hole in Congress‘s comprehensive effort to achieve ―near-
universal‖ health insurance coverage.  ACA § 1501(a)(2)(D).  
As the foregoing illustrates, like the individual mandate, the Medicaid 
expansions are a central component of the ACA, designed to ―work[] in tandem‖ 
with the Act‘s other core insurance reforms.  R.E. 141.  Whether the other core 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/24/2011     Page: 34 of 41
25 
 
reforms are capable of operating without the Medicaid expansions is irrelevant, as 
they are plainly not capable of operating ―in a manner consistent with the intent of 
Congress.‖  Brock, 480 U.S. at 685.  The same is true of the ACA‘s hundreds of 
other less central provisions.8  As the government itself has argued, ―[w]hen 
Congress passed the ACA, it was careful to ensure that any increased spending, 
including on Medicaid, was offset by other revenue-raising and cost-saving 
provisions.‖  R.E. 1024 (emphasis added).  There is simply no reason to believe 
Congress would have calibrated the ACA‘s hundreds of other provisions to achieve 
precisely the same delicate fiscal balance had it not anticipated spending an 
additional $434 billion on Medicaid by the end of the decade.  R.E. 1425.   
The government makes no meaningful attempt to demonstrate otherwise, but 
instead simply maintains severance is too inconvenient a remedy to employ in this 
situation.  See Govt.‘s Response/Reply Br. 56–57.  That argument runs roughshod 
over the democratic processes that the severance doctrine is intended to protect.  
―[T]he touchstone for any decision about [severance] is legislative intent, for a 
                                       
8 The government makes much of the fact that Washington State believes the 
severance analysis ―is arguably different‖ for the provision of the ACA that 
reauthorizes and amends the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (IHCIA).  See 
Govt.‘s Response/Reply Br. 56.  As an initial matter, as is clear from the States‘ 
opening brief, that position is not advanced by the other 25 Plaintiff States.  See 
States‘ Opening Br. 65 n.8.  In any event, the government cannot and does not 
demonstrate that the unique circumstances suggesting that Congress might have 
passed the IHCIA independent from the rest of the ACA are applicable to any of 
the other reauthorization or extension provisions the government cites.  
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/24/2011     Page: 35 of 41
26 
 
court cannot use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature.‖  
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  When ―it is evident that the Legislature would 
not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that 
which is not,‖ Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) (per curiam) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted), there remains no principled basis for 
keeping the rest of the provisions in place.  If Congress ultimately concludes that 
certain provisions of the ACA have already become sufficiently entrenched to 
warrant rescue, it is free to reenact those provisions in subsequent legislation.  But 
that determination is for Congress, not this Court, to make. 
Finally, the government‘s contention that the States lack standing to argue 
that the rest of the ACA must fall with the Medicaid expansions is erroneous.  
Severability is a remedial question necessitated by invalidation of the challenged 
provision, not a separate claim that a plaintiff must have some sort of additional 
standing to bring.  See Frazier ex rel. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th 
Cir. 2008) (―Having determined that the [challenged provision] is a violation of the 
Constitution, we must consider whether [it] is severable from the rest of the 
statute.‖).  So long as the States have standing to allege that the Medicaid 
expansions are unconstitutional (which they indisputably do), this Court may 
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properly determine whether the invalidation of those provisions necessitates 
invalidation of the entire ACA. 
In any event, even if there were a separate standing inquiry for severance 
arguments, any such inquiry would be satisfied by a showing that the plaintiff is 
injured by any of the act‘s remaining provisions.  See States‘ Opening Br. 66.  The 
States have plainly made that showing.  The government does not dispute, for 
example, that the States are directly injured by the ACA‘s employer mandate 
provisions.  And the government neither acknowledges nor disputes the States‘ 
assertion (at 67-68) that they are injured by the individual mandate because it 
forces millions of individuals onto the Medicaid rolls — including individuals who 
were already eligible for Medicaid, but had previously declined to enroll —
 thereby substantially increasing the States‘ share of Medicaid funding.  See 
Govt.‘s Response/Reply 61.9  The States have therefore satisfied any standing 
inquiry that might be applicable to their severance argument.  
                                       
9 As the States noted in their opening brief (at 7), the ACA only provides additional 
Medicaid funding for costs attributable to ―newly eligible individuals.‖  ACA 
§ 2001(a)(3) (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1)).  It does not increase federal 
funding for costs attributable to previously eligible individuals who are now forced 
to enroll in Medicaid to comply with the individual mandate. 
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